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Abstract The idea that emotional experience is capable of lending immediate and
defeasible justification to evaluative belief has been amassing significant support in
recent years. The proposal that it is my anger, say, that justifies my belief that I’ve
been wronged putatively provides us with an intuitive and naturalised explanation as
to how we receive epistemic justification for a rich catalogue of our evaluative
beliefs. However, despite the fact that this justificatory thesis of emotion is fun-
damentally an epistemological proposal, comparatively little has been done to
explicitly isolate what it is about emotions that bestows them with justificatory
ability. The purpose of this paper is to provide a novel and thorough analysis into
the prospects of phenomenology-based—or dogmatist—views of emotional justi-
fication. By surveying and rejecting various instantiations of the emotional dog-
matist view, I endeavour to provide an inductive case for the conclusion that
emotional phenomenology cannot be the seat of the emotions’ power to immedi-
ately justify evaluative belief.
Keywords Emotion  Phenomenal dogmatism  Epistemic justification  Seemings 
Phenomenology
1 Introduction
The idea that emotional experience is capable of lending immediate and defeasible
justification to evaluative belief has been gaining significant traction in recent years.
The proposal that it is my anger, say, that justifies me in believing that I’ve been
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offended putatively provides us with an intuitive and naturalised explanation as to
how we receive epistemic justification for a rich catalogue of our evaluative beliefs.
With many notable advocates, this justificatory thesis of emotion is fast becoming a
central facet in how we conceive of the emotions’ epistemic role.1 Interestingly,
however, comparatively little of the philosophical literature has been dedicated to
explicitly isolating what it is about emotional experience that bestows it with the
ability to immediately and defeasibly justify belief. The aim of this paper is to
present and evaluate an internalist view of emotional justification, namely, one
which identifies emotional phenomenology as the source of the emotions’ ability to
justify evaluative belief.
Support for a phenomenology-based view can be found in various suggestive
comments made by notable authors in the philosophy of emotion. Goldie (2004), for
example, argues on behalf of an account of emotion ‘‘where the feelings involved
are at center stage, playing a centrally important epistemic role in revealing things
about the world’’ (p. 92). On a similar note, Tappolet (2016) argues that emotional
experiences uniquely ‘‘allow us to be aware of certain features of the world’’ (p. 18),
while Johnston (2001) claims that the epistemic import of affective experiences is
rooted in their providing us with ‘‘affective disclosure’’ (p. 213) of evaluative
properties. The focus of these claims on ‘feelings’, ‘awareness’, and ‘affective
disclosure’ certainly seems at least suggestive of the fact that these authors take the
phenomenal properties instantiated by emotional experience—the what-it-is-like for
a subject to undergo emotional experience—to bear epistemic significance.
So, how might we construct a phenomenology-based view of emotional
justification? One plausible way is to build it as relevantly analogous to phenomenal
dogmatism. For phenomenal dogmatists, a perceptual experience that makes it seem
to you that p immediately and defeasibly justifies you in believing that p. Given that
phenomenal dogmatism is an attractive internalist view of justification that places
epistemic importance on experiential phenomenology, we can draw up an emotional
analogue accordingly, such that an emotional experience that makes it seem to you
that e (where e signifies a proposition attributing an evaluative property to an object)
immediately and defeasibly justifies you in believing that e. Call this emotional
dogmatism. Here, by surveying and rejecting several instantiations of the emotional
dogmatist view, I endeavour to build an inductive case for the conclusion that the
phenomenal character of emotional experience cannot be what makes it capable of
immediately and defeasibly justifying evaluative belief.
The structure of this paper is as follows. §2 begins by further elucidating the
phenomenal dogmatist view and presenting the analogous emotional dogmatist
thesis. In §2.1, I argue that basic dogmatism, which requires only that the experience
bears unqualified seeming phenomenal character, falls foul to a worrisome over-
generalisation problem. In §3, I suggest that a restrictive account of phenomenal
dogmatism based on Chudnoff’s presentationalism is better placed for an
investigation into the prospects of an analogous emotional dogmatist view. §3.1
then presents a novel objection against this view, namely, that there is no plausible
1 See, for instance, Cowan (2018), Döring (2007), Pelser (2014), and Tappolet (2016).
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way of spelling out what seeming awareness of truth-makers for evaluative
propositions consists in. §4 then considers and rejects alternative restricted views
based on McGrath’s and Markie’s respective accounts of restricted phenomenal
dogmatism. Finally, I conclude that, while emotional seeming states might be
capable of transmitting justification to evaluative belief mediated by other mental
states and beliefs, we have good reason to believe that they cannot bear immediate
justificatory power.
2 Basic emotional dogmatism
Let us understand phenomenal dogmatism as follows:
Phenomenal Dogmatism (PD): if it perceptually seems to S that p, then, in the
absence of defeaters, S thereby has [immediate] justification for believing that
p. (Tucker 2013, p. 2).
Some clarifications are in order. First, PD is an internalist view of justification
insofar as it identifies factors internal to the agent (i.e. an agent’s seeming states) as
sole epistemic justifiers. Second, and importantly, PD is a thesis about immediate
justification, i.e. justification which exists independently of any inferential
connections to other justified beliefs. Third, identifying the source of an
experience’s justificatory power in its bearing the character of ‘seeming to S that
p’ is to identify it in the experience’s phenomenal character, i.e. the something-that-
it-is-like for the subject to undergo the perceptual experience. Fourth, ‘seemings’
are typically taken to be non-doxastic propositional attitudes. Finally, while the
nature of seeming phenomenal character can be difficult to elucidate in writing, it
will be sufficient for our purposes to conceive of it along similar lines to the way in
which Tucker (2010) describes it, i.e. seemings instantiate the phenomenal property
of asserting or insisting to you that the content of the experience obtains.
Insofar as we’re interested in building an account of emotional epistemology on
the basis of PD, we can conceive of emotional dogmatism as follows:
Emotional Dogmatism (ED): if it emotionally seems to S that e (where
e signifies a proposition which attributes an evaluative property to an object)
then, in the absence of defeaters, S thereby has immediate justification for
believing that e.
On this view, just as my visual seeming experience of the blue mug can
immediately and defeasibly justify my belief that there is a blue mug, my emotional
seeming experience of awe towards a painting can immediately and defeasibly
justify me in believing that the painting is beautiful. This view is attractive for a
number of reasons. First, PD is praised in virtue of its ability to provide a simple and
intuitive explanation as to how we receive epistemic justification for our beliefs
about the world; we’re justified in believing what we do because of the way the
world appears to us in our perceptual experience. Analogously, for ED, we’re
justified in our evaluative beliefs about the world because of the way it appears to us
in our emotional experience. Secondly, given the focus on immediate justification,
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PD provides an antidote to pernicious sceptical worries pertaining to the
justificatory status of our everyday beliefs about the sensible world. Epistemic
justification comes at a low price for PD in virtue of all that’s required is that our
perceptual experiences bear the right sort of ‘seeming’ character; the justification
need not be mediated via relations to other justified beliefs. Insofar as ED is built on
the foundations of PD, it can provide an analogous remedy for sceptical worries
pertaining to the justificatory status of our everyday evaluative beliefs. Finally,
given the importance of justification for the acquisition of further epistemic goods,
dogmatist views can provide a substantive epistemic yield which extends beyond
justified belief and plausibly into the domain of both perceptual and evaluative
knowledge and understanding.
2.1 Objection: an over-generalisation problem
However, a worry with identifying an experience’s justificatory power in its bearing
unqualified seeming phenomenal character is that the theory lacks the ability to
exclude epistemically problematic cases. A popular way of presenting this challenge
is in terms of the following example from Markie (2005):
Suppose that we are prospecting for gold. You have learned to identify a gold
nugget on sight but I have no such knowledge. As the water washes out of my
pan, we both look at a pebble, which is in fact a gold nugget. My desire to
discover gold makes it seem to me as if the pebble is gold; your learned
identification skills make it seem that way to you. According to [PD], the
belief that it is gold has prima facie justification for both of us. (p. 356–357).
This problem constitutes a serious threat for PD. The possibility of states like
desires manipulating the content of seemings, and thereby having an influence over
which of our beliefs enjoy immediate justification, is worrisome for any theory
which attributes such epistemic significance to these seemings. Indeed, consider an
emotional case. To borrow an example from Brady (2013, p. 87), suppose that I’m
on the hiring committee for a job, and upon interviewing a particular candidate, I
find myself experiencing a negative emotion that makes it seem to me that this
candidate is duplicitous or untrustworthy. It would be implausible to claim that this
emotion alone is capable of immediately justifying my belief that the candidate is
duplicitous on the basis of its bearing seeming phenomenal character. However,
insofar as ED only identifies unqualified emotional seemings as justification-
conferring states, it lacks the theoretical resources to exclude cases like this. It
cannot be true that it’s only in virtue of an experience bearing this ‘seeming’
character that it is capable of justifying the relevant beliefs, or else we would have
to concede that the gold prospector’s wishfully-produced perceptual belief that the
pebble is gold is afforded the same justifying role as the skill-produced belief of the
mineral expert, or that the suspicious interviewer’s belief is justified on the basis of
their rogue emotional experience.
The staunch dogmatist might resist this objection, however. In response to over-
generalisation cases, proponents of these views may bite the bullet and allow that, in
virtue of their bearing the right kind of seeming character, experiences like these are
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capable of immediately and defeasibly justifying belief. That is, the dogmatist might
be perfectly happy to concede that their theory generalises to experiences like those
of Markie’s gold-prospector or the suspicious interviewer, but deny that this is
particularly problematic. It may be counterintuitive to those who aren’t naturally
inclined to internalist views, but this isn’t a decisive objection insofar as these views
can plausibly diagnose the intuitive oddness of these cases in other ways, e.g. by
pointing to the fact that it is only defeasible and not ultima facie justification
conferred by these experiences, and that our intuitions aren’t sufficiently fine-
grained to track the difference between the two, and to the fact that this justification
is easily and often defeated, and so forth. Thus, dogmatism appears to have a
relatively straightforward escape clause such that it can disarm worries concerning
the apparent profligacy of the account.
This form of bullet-biting strikes me as implausible. To illustrate why, consider a
weak-willed agent who finds themselves living within a community of racists, all of
whom harbour xenophobic beliefs towards those from a different ethnicity to
themselves. Out of a strong desire to fit in with this group, the agent actively
engages with these xenophobic beliefs. She listens to racist propaganda, attends
community events celebrating the exploits of racist historical figures, and so forth.
Over time, she comes to adopt these beliefs herself, such that she forms a network of
biases towards particular ethnic groups. As such, upon encountering any person that
belongs to such a group, she habitually has the seeming that this person is acting
suspiciously.
Plausibly, these xenophobic seemings are attributable to the agent herself and,
specifically, to her desire to integrate into her community. She created and is
responsible for the formation of those seemings. Dogmatists, in virtue of their
commitment to the claim that it is defeasible and not ultima facie justification
conferred by experience, can explain why the agent’s xenophobic seemings do not
justify her in believing that the person from a particular ethnic group is acting
suspiciously only if she has an awareness of her experience’s etiology. That is, for
dogmatists, the justification conferred by the xenophobic seemings is defeated by
her awareness of the fact that the seemings are ultimately attributable to her
desires.2 However, it also seems plausible that, as time passes and she successfully
integrates into the community, she comes to forget that her desire to fit in was the
source of these xenophobic seemings. Her racist beliefs become such an entrenched
part of her cognitive architecture that she no longer questions them nor their origin.3
Dogmatism then generates the strange result that the agent is not experientially
2 See Huemer (2013) for the argument that an experience’s problematic etiology is epistemically relevant
to the justificatory status of the belief only when the subject has an awareness of that etiology.
3 One might object that a case like this, i.e. a case in which an agent has no defeaters for the content of
her xenophobic seemings, is unrealistic, given the many reasons that racist individuals typically have for
doubting the accuracy of their xenophobic responses. In response, let me clarify that I don’t intend for this
counterexample to be representative of many real life cases, nor does it need to be in order for it to be
successful. All that needs to obtain in order for the point to go through is that it meets the conditions for
ED, and, yet, it seems counterintuitive to bestow justificatory power to the xenophobic seemings. For
what it’s worth, however, it’s not obvious to me that this case is particularly contrived or beyond the
realm of possibility.
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justified in her belief that the person is behaving suspiciously at a time t1 where she
is aware that her desire is the origin of the xenophobic seemings, but she is justified
on the basis of those seemings at a time t2 where she has forgotten that this is the
case. This strikes me as counterintuitive. It’s odd to suggest that forgetting
something can enhance the positive epistemic status of a belief, especially when that
belief is causally traceable and attributable to an agent’s epistemically dubious
desire.4 Dogmatists seem to be getting the wrong result here.
Now, there are two ways in which the defender of ED might respond. First, the
dogmatist may argue that, while there is something intuitively problematic about
this case, it’s not obvious that the problem pertains to the presence of epistemic
justification. That is, one might contend that what our intuitions in this case are
actually tracking is the agent’s moral blameworthiness, or zetetic failings pertaining
to her process of poor epistemic inquiry.5 If these failings are the source of our
intuition that there is something amiss with this case, then the emotional dogmatist
is let off the hook insofar as there’s not actually anything problematic about
bestowing her emotional seemings with justificatory power at t2.
I take it that the best strategy for establishing that there is an epistemic failing
here (and, specifically, one pertinent to the presence of justification) is to consider
an analogous case in which there are no obvious moral or zetetic failings which
plausibly hijack the intuition that there’s something amiss with bestowing
justificatory power to the emotional seemings. If we neutralise these non-
justificatory failings and there’s still something problematic about the epistemic
result, then we have good reason to believe that this case does constitute an over-
generalisation worry for ED. On that note, consider the following. Suppose that,
through a powerful desire to be liked by everybody, I come to believe that a person
has strong affection for me whenever they remember my name. Consequently, I
habitually experience the emotional seeming of joy whenever anybody refers to me
by name; it emotionally seems to me that this referral is a very good thing for me. At
a time t1, when I am aware of these seemings’ causal origin in my wishful thinking,
they don’t justify my evaluative belief that this event is good for me. At a later time
t2, when I have forgotten the etiology of these seemings, they do justify my
evaluative belief.
Now, this case shares the same general structure as the original over-
generalisation case for ED. Plausibly, however, there’s no obvious moral failing
in this case. Moreover, it strikes me as unlikely that the issue at play is a zetetic
worry pertaining to my poor process of epistemic inquiry given that I’m plausibly
not conducting an inquiry when I have the emotional seeming of joy after somebody
refers to me by name. According to Friedman (2019), a necessary condition for a
subject to count as an inquirer, and to thereby have their process of inquiry subject
to zetetic norms of assessment, is that they possess an ‘‘interrogative attitude’’ (p.
299) towards the question at hand, i.e. they’re curious or contemplative as to what
4 Note that many seem to share similar intuitions about cases like this. See, for example, Huemer (1999,
p. 349) and Annis (1980, p. 326).
5 Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for raising this response.
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the answer is. In this case, it’s not obvious that I have the goal-directed activity of
pursuing an answer to the question as to what any given individual’s attitude is
towards me; I just have the psychologically immediate experience of joy whenever
a person refers to me by name, given my beliefs about what that referral means and
my powerful desire to be liked. So, if a subject isn’t morally or zetetically
blameworthy in a case like this, but there still seems to be something counterintuive
about allowing their evaluative belief to be justified by their emotional seemings,
then this seems best explained in terms of the subject’s specific epistemic failing,
such that bestowing their emotional seemings with justificatory power constitutes an
over-generalisation problem for ED.
A second argument that the dogmatist might make in response to the over-
generalisation case specifically concerns the worry that, for ED, forgetting key
defeating evidence can improve the epistemic status of one’s evaluative belief. To
dispel this counterintuitive result, the dogmatist might appropriate argumentative
resources from discussions of forgotten evidence and defeat in the epistemology of
memory literature. One particularly relevant discussion concerns Huemer’s (1999)
proposal of the following diachronic view of phenomenal conservatism:
A belief is justified full stop if and only if one had an adequate justification for
adopting it at some point, and thenceforward one was justified in retaining it.
(p. 351).
This view is proposed partially in response to cases of forgotten defeat that are
typically levelled against synchronic views of internalist justification. In these cases,
a subject forms a belief that p via epistemically irrational means, such as wishful
thinking. At a time t1, when the subject is aware of this, her belief that p is
unjustified. However, as time passes, the subject forgets the means through which
she arrived at p, and retains p in memory at t2. The worry is that many synchronic
views will deliver the result that p is justified at t2 given that, at this time, the
subject’s defeater for p is lost to memory. Huemer’s diachronic phenomenal
conservatism attempts to avoid this result by claiming that a belief is overall
justified if and only if the subject was once justified in adopting that belief, i.e., the
subject’s past mental states matter for the present justificatory status of one’s belief.
Given that, in the forgotten defeat case, the subject was never justified in adopting
p because of its formation via irrational means, Huemer’s view avoids the
counterintuitive result. Returning to the case at hand, then, perhaps the emotional
dogmatist can argue something similar. That is, assuming a view like Huemer’s,
perhaps one can argue that the xenophobic subject is not justified in her evaluative
belief that the person is acting suspiciously at t2 because the evaluative belief was
not justified at t1, given her then-awareness of her emotional seemings’ etiology.
Here’s the problem with this response. Even if diachronic views of this sort turn
out to be plausible,6 reasoning drawn from these discussions in the epistemology of
memory cannot get a foothold on this over-generalisation case for ED given that,
here, nothing is being retained in memory. Recall that, in the forgotten defeat cases
6 See Moon (2012) and Smithies (2019) for arguments against diachronic moves of this type.
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pertinent to diachronic views like Huemer’s, the subject forgets the defeating
evidence but retains the belief that p via memory. The problem is that, in ED’s over-
generalisation case, the subject does not memorially retain the same belief that the
person is acting suspiciously from t1 to t2. Rather, at t2, the subject has another
emotional seeming experience which causes the belief which, crucially, is distinct
from the belief formed at t1. Because memory is playing no role here, plugging in a
view like Huemer’s will not be sufficient to dispel the counterintuive result
delivered by ED, nor can it absolve the dogmatist of the over-generalisation charge.
So, in summary, if identifying unqualified seemings as justifiers results in an
overly permissive account of justification, and if endorsing such an account results
in counterintuitive implications, then PD and ED are not plausible accounts of
immediate experiential justification.
3 Restricted emotional dogmatism
A natural response for the dogmatist to make here is to tighten and finetune their
account so as to exclude the over-generalisation cases presented above. One
notable example of such a view is proposed by Chudnoff. On Chudnoff’s view, it’s
not sufficient for a perceptual experience to make it seem to you that p in order for it
to justify your belief that p. Rather, the experience must instantiate the property of
having presentational phenomenology with respect to p. Chudnoff (2013) sets out
the notion of presentational phenomenology as follows:
What it is for an experience of yours to have presentational phenomenology
with respect to p is for it to both make it seem to you that p and make it seem
to you as if this experience makes you aware of a truth-maker for p (p. 37).
Crucially, what distinguishes Chudnoff’s view from basic PD is the addition of
the truth-maker condition. On this account, if my visual experience of the mug on
the desk immediately and defeasibly justifies my belief that there is a mug on the
desk, it does so in virtue of having presentational phenomenology with respect to
that proposition, i.e. it both makes it seem to me that there is a mug on the desk and
makes it seem as if I’m visually aware of an item in my perceptible surroundings
that makes that proposition true. Thus, we get the following restricted phenomenal
dogmatist view:
Presentationalism: S’s perceptual experience is capable of immediately and
defeasibly justifying her belief that p if and only if the experience both makes
it seem to S that p and makes it seem as if S is perceptually aware of a truth-
maker for p.
There are good reasons to endorse presentationalism. One of the central
motivations for the view is that the notion of presentational phenomenology chimes
well with various characterisations of the epistemically significant phenomenal
character of visual experience offered by phenomenal dogmatists in the literature,
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while providing a more robust diagnosis of this character.7 Moreover, the presence
of the truth-maker condition makes Chudnoff’s account better able to deflect over-
generalisation cases, e.g. if presentationalism is true, then Markie’s wishful
prospector cannot be justified in their seeming-based belief that the pebble is gold
because what makes that proposition true, i.e. the chemical composition of the
pebble, is not something that can figure into visual seeming awareness. Therefore,
because the visual experience does not make it seem as if the prospector is
perceptually aware of a truth-maker for the relevant proposition, it cannot lend
justification to the relevant belief.
Now, in light of this development, let’s return to the emotions. We can transpose
the theoretical machinery of presentational phenomenology over to the case of
emotional experience in order to construct the following restricted account of
emotional dogmatism:
Restricted Emotional Dogmatism (RED): S’s emotional experience is capable
of immediately and defeasibly justifying her evaluative belief e if and only if
the experience both makes it seem to her that e, and makes it seem as if she is
emotionally aware of a truth-maker for e.
One interesting thing to note here is that RED, insofar as it places epistemic
significance on the emotional experience making it seem to you as if you’re aware
of a truth-maker for an evaluative proposition, fits nicely with the comments
provided by Goldie, Tappolet, and Johnston in §1. Recall that in their respective
descriptions of the epistemic power of emotions, Goldie described emotional
feelings as capable of ‘‘revealing things about the world’’, while Tappolet suggested
that emotional experiences ‘‘allow us to be aware of certain features of the world’’.
The suggestion here that emotional experiences provide us with some sort of unique
awareness about things out there in the world seems to closely match RED’s
requirement of emotional experiences making it seem as if we’re aware of truth-
makers for evaluative propositions, i.e. things out there that make evaluative
propositions true. Indeed, Johnston explicitly uses the language of truth-makers
insofar as he claims that ‘‘affect discloses evaluative truth-makers’’ (2001, p. 206),
and that this (at least partially) explains what he terms the ‘‘epistemic authority’’ (p.
205) of affective experiences. By including the truth-maker condition, then, RED
coheres with views about the epistemic import of emotional phenomenology in the
surrounding literature, inherits the general advantages of the basic ED account and
receives support from a more theoretically robust epistemological framework which
avoids the pitfalls of basic dogmatism.
However, RED also faces significant challenges. Before presenting my own
critique, let us first address a challenge levelled against RED by Brogaard and
Chudnoff (2016). In their analysis, RED is rejected on the grounds that it builds
phenomenologically unrealistic contents into the scope of emotional seeming
awareness. For Brogaard and Chudnoff, emotional experience cannot bring seeming
awareness of truth-makers for evaluative propositions because evaluative properties
7 See Chudnoff (2012, p. 56) for further detail.
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are not suitable objects of emotional awareness. Crucially, this is because evaluative
properties bear a normative dimension; they merit certain emotional responses. For
an emotional experience to make it seem as if I’m aware of an evaluative property
instantiated by an object, that emotional experience would have to reflexively
present itself as being epistemically merited by the object. This, for Brogaard and
Chudnoff, cannot be true. Whether an object merits that particular emotional
response is not something I can be aware of via my own emotional phenomenology.
I will not pursue this criticism against RED. Instead, I will propose a different
challenge which focuses not on RED’s putative commitment to controversial
phenomenological assertions, but on its commitment to controversial epistemolog-
ical results. My reason for this is twofold. First, note that whether one finds
Brogaard and Chudnoff’s challenge compelling relies on their having the intuition
that emotional experience cannot bear a very specific kind of self-reflexive
phenomenology. This doesn’t strike me as a commonly held intuition. There are
those in the literature who, at the very least, are amenable to the suggestion that
emotions can be experienced as being epistemically merited with respect to their
objects, and some even propose accounts of emotional phenomenology in which this
is explicitly the case.8 Second, and relatedly, it seems at least prima facie plausible
that our intuitions have significantly more reliability and argumentative traction
within the domain of epistemological theorising, given the frequency with which
counterexamples are cited as compelling objections to epistemological views. Our
intuitions when it comes to specific introspective phenomenological claims, on the
other hand, are plausibly less widely-shared, less reliable, and less dialectically
compelling. For these reasons, §3.1 will solely pursue the forthcoming epistemo-
logical challenge against RED.
3.1 Objection: the dilemma of evaluative truth-makers
Here, I argue that RED’s inclusion of the truth-maker condition spells serious
trouble for the view. Specifically, RED faces a dilemma in what seeming awareness
of truth-makers for evaluative propositions consists in. Take an experience of fear
towards an approaching snake. In order for that experience of fear to justify the
evaluative belief that the snake is fearsome, the experience must both make it seem
to you that the snake is fearsome and make it seem as if you’re emotionally aware of
a truth-maker for that evaluative proposition. But what is the truth-maker for this
proposition? RED, as expressed thus far, is silent as to whether the truth-maker
consists in the evaluative property of fearsomeness itself, or whether it consists in
the non-evaluative properties instantiated by the snake that give rise to the
evaluative property of fearsomeness, i.e. the sharp fangs, the aggressive movements,
and so forth. Call these ‘the evaluative property reading’ and ‘the non-evaluative
property reading’ of the truth-maker condition respectively. The problem is that
neither of these options looks promising for RED.
8 See Mitchell (2017) and Poellner (2016) for explicit endorsements of the idea that emotions are capable
of bearing this self-reflexive phenomenal character.
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Let’s begin with the evaluative property reading, which can be spelled out as
follows:
REDEP: S’s emotional experience is capable of immediately and defeasibly
justifying her evaluative belief e if and only if the experience both makes it
seem to her that e and makes it seem as if she’s emotionally aware of the
evaluative property putatively instantiated by the object.
Immediately, a problem arises here. Namely, while the inclusion of the truth-
maker condition seems to suitably restrict dogmatism in the perceptual case, it’s not
at all clear that this reading of the truth-maker condition restricts RED at all.
Reconsider Brady’s suspicious interviewer. The worry is that REDEP can’t exclude
the interviewer’s emotional experience of suspicion because their experience
satisfies both the seeming condition and the truth-maker condition. That is, insofar
as the emotional experience already makes it seem to the interviewer that the
candidate is duplicitous (and they’re not aware of any reason to distrust this
seeming), then plausibly their experience of suspicion also makes it seem to them
that the candidate instantiates the property of ‘duplicitousness’. The evaluative
property reading of the truth-maker condition doesn’t seem to be adding any further
requirement to emotional dogmatism, given that any emotional experience which
satisfies the seeming condition will also satisfy the truth-maker condition. What else
could it mean for an emotional experience to make it seem to you that the candidate
is duplicitous, other than making it seem as if you’re aware of the evaluative
property of ‘duplicitousness’ putatively instantiated by the candidate? Naturally,
then, REDEP will continue to over-generalise to problematic cases precisely
because, in practice, it’s no different to ED.
At this point, the defender of REDEP may argue that the case is under-described.
In response to this over-generalisation worry, they might attempt to re-describe the
case in order to motivate the plausibility of conceding justification to the
interviewer. They may suggest, for instance, that the interviewer’s emotional
experience of suspicion makes it seem as if they’re emotionally aware of the
duplicitousness instantiated by the candidate because the interviewer is picking up
on subtle duplicitous-making features of the candidate, i.e. that their emotional
seeming awareness of duplicitousness is caused by their perception of certain
mannerisms and micro-behaviours indicative of duplicitousness, such as avoiding
the gaze of the interview panel, excessive talking, smirking, etc. Thus, the defender
of REDEP might argue that the emotional experience makes it seem as if they’re
emotionally aware of the property ‘duplicitousness’ instantiated by the candidate
because they’re aware of the relevant pattern of non-evaluative properties. If this is
the case, then conceding justification on the basis of these emotional seemings
doesn’t seem problematic.
The problem with this response is that REDEP lacks the ability to distinguish
between a case like this, i.e. a case in which the emotional seeming awareness of
duplicitousness is caused by a seeming awareness of a pattern of duplicitous-making
features of the candidate, and a case in which the emotional seeming awareness of
‘duplicitousness’ is caused by epistemically dubious cognitive biases (e.g. suppose
that the candidate is a woman and the interviewer is unknowingly biased against
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women). The worry is that, insofar as the epistemically relevant emotional
seemings—i.e. the seeming that the candidate is duplicitous and the seeming
awareness of the evaluative property ‘duplicitousness’ instantiated by the candidate
– can be grounded in either of these causal explanations, REDEP doesn’t have the
tools to differentiate the good and bad cases; both types of emotional seemings (i.e.
those produced by epistemically legitimate means and those produced by
epistemically illegitimate means) have the same justificatory power. This is a bad
result.
So, if the source of RED’s continued vulnerability to the over-generalisation
problem is conceiving of truth-makers for evaluative propositions as evaluative
properties themselves, why not abandon this claim and insist instead that the truth-
maker for an evaluative proposition is the relevant set of non-evaluative properties
instantiated by the object which would make the proposition true? This is the non-
evaluative property reading, and can be spelled out as follows:
REDNEP: S’s emotional experience is capable of immediately and defeasibly
justifying her evaluative belief e if and only if the experience both makes it
seem to her that e and makes it seem as if she’s emotionally aware of the set of
non-evaluative properties that, if instantiated, would give rise to the relevant
evaluative property, and so make e true.
The attraction of this reading is that, unlike REDEP, it avoids obvious over-
generalisation cases like the biased interviewer. Recall that, in this case, the
interviewer’s emotional seeming awareness of the candidate’s duplicitousness is
caused by their bias against women. This case would not meet the requirements of
REDNEP precisely because the interviewer’s emotional experience is not making it
seem as if they’re aware of the set of non-evaluative properties that would make the
proposition ‘the candidate is duplicitous’ true. Rather, their experience is being
triggered by the combination of their sexist bias and their perception of the
candidate’s gender. Clearly, mere seeming awareness of the candidate’s gender does
not amount to seeming awareness of the candidate instantiating particular non-
evaluative properties which would make the proposition ‘the candidate is
duplicitous’ true. Thus, REDNEP avoids the charge of over-generalisation because
it can epistemically differentiate between the good case (i.e. the case in which the
interviewer’s emotional seemings of duplicitousness are caused by their perception
of duplicitous-making non-evaluative features of the candidate), and the bad case
(i.e. the case in which the interviewer’s emotional seemings of duplicitousness are
caused by their perception of the candidate’s gender and their bias against women).
The problem, however, is that REDNEP is now too restrictive. If we identify these
conjunctions of non-evaluative properties as truth-makers, then very few of our
emotional experiences would be capable of bearing justificatory power. It seems
that only very basic emotional experiences, like fear of a snake or disgust towards
spoiled milk, for example, are reliably capable of bringing the required wide-
ranging emotional seeming awareness of the relevant non-evaluative properties that
would make the relevant proposition (e.g. ‘the snake is fearsome’, or ‘the spoiled
milk is disgusting’) true. Emotional experiences which do not figure into this very
basic category often don’t bring awareness of the relevant non-evaluative
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properties.9 Take an emotional experience of awe towards a piece of artwork which
does not bring full seeming awareness of the non-evaluative properties which would
make the proposition ‘that artwork is beautiful’ true, or an experience of amusement
towards a particular state of affairs which does not bring seeming awareness of the
particular amusement-making non-evaluative properties. Despite the absence of
such fine-grained seeming awareness, it seems entirely possible that emotional
experiences of this sort are capable of providing a positive epistemic contribution to
the status of the corresponding evaluative beliefs. Thus, robbing these emotions of
immediate justificatory power on the basis of their not fulfilling the strict
phenomenological requirements for REDNEP strikes me as bad news for the view.
Here, there are two possible responses available to the defender of REDNEP. The
first of which is to concede that, understood this way, the view ends up being
restrictive but deny that this is problematic. Indeed, the defender of REDNEP might
stress that the lesson to be learned from the over-generalisation problem is that we
should be casting a narrow net around the emotional experiences capable of bearing
justificatory power. We want to rule out cases in which emotional seemings look
like they’re not grounded in epistemically legitimate observations of the relevant
non-evaluative properties, and the best way of doing this is to impose strict
constraints on what counts as emotional seeming awareness of truth-makers. If a
consequence of this is that relatively complex emotional experiences which do not
bring seeming awareness of the relevant non-evaluative properties end up getting
ruled out of the account (insofar as they do not make it seem as if one is emotionally
aware of a truth-maker for the relevant evaluative proposition), then so be it. The
worry with conceding epistemic austerity here, however, is that one desideratum for
a plausible version of a justificatory thesis of emotion is that it can account for how
a broad catalogue of our evaluative beliefs can be justified by emotional
experiences. If endorsing REDNEP means that we can only consider very basic
emotional experiences as capable of bearing justificatory ability, then our dogmatist
approach to emotional justification is failing to provide a satisfactory picture of the
immediate justificatory capacity of emotional experience.
Secondly, the objector might argue that in these scenarios—take the amusement
case, for example – my emotional experience is, in fact, making it seem as if I’m
aware of the relevant collection of non-evaluative properties which would make the
event amusing, I just can’t articulate exactly what those properties are. One
suggestion in support of this might be something like the following. When
prompted, i.e. when asked ‘what’s so funny?’, I can gesture vaguely towards the
features of the situation that make it amusing, such as the particular comment made,
the context in which it was made, and so forth, even if I can’t express the amusing-
making minutia. In other words, I’m not at a complete loss as to what it is about the
situation that makes it amusing, and this is all that’s needed for evidence of
emotional seeming awareness of the relevant conjunction of non-evaluative
9 Echeverri (2019) makes a similar point about the limits of awareness when it comes to the non-
evaluative properties which constitute or give rise to the evaluative property in question, arguing that
there are many relational properties which contribute towards an object exemplifying a given evaluative
property, most of which we are ‘‘typically’’ (p. 550) not aware of.
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properties. Therefore, we can tell some story about having emotional seeming
awareness of the relevant truth-maker in these cases, and REDNEP doesn’t end up
being objectionably restrictive with respect to the kinds of emotional experiences is
bestows with justificatory power.
The problem with this response is that further ambiguity in what emotional
seeming awareness of truth-makers consists in raises difficult questions for REDNEP.
If all that matters for emotional seeming awareness of truth-makers is that the
experience makes the subject capable of gesturing towards the non-evaluative
features of the object which would make the relevant evaluative proposition true,
then it becomes less clear that REDNEP is able to rule out problematic cases. Take
the suspicious interviewer whose emotional seemings that the candidate is
duplicitous are caused by sexist bias. Plausibly, their emotional experience of
suspicion will make them capable of saying something about what seems to make
the candidate duplicitous (e.g. ‘‘there’s just something about them’’), but this still
seems insufficient for the interviewer to be justified in their belief that the candidate
is duplicitous. Substantively relaxing the notion of awareness in order to let in cases
where the emotional experience doesn’t make it seem as if one is aware of (i.e. able
to identify) all of the relevant non-evaluative properties runs the risk of letting the
epistemically illegitimate cases like biased suspicious interviewer in through the
back door.
In summary, RED is confronted with a troubling dilemma. Either we identify
evaluative properties themselves as the truth-makers for evaluative propositions
(REDEP), in which case the view continues to over-generalise, or we identify the
relevant aggregate of non-evaluative properties as truth-makers for evaluative
propositions (REDNEP), in which case the view rules out emotional experiences
which, plausibly, are capable of immediately justifying the relevant evaluative
beliefs. If endorsing RED means that we must commit to either an objectionably
profligate account of emotional justification or instead one which is objectionably
austere, then RED does not provide a suitable framework for thinking about the
immediate justificatory power of emotional experiences.
4 Alternative restricted emotional dogmatism
One question the reader might have at this point is whether there exists an
alternative instantiation of a restricted emotional dogmatist view. That is, if the
addition of the Chudnoff-inspired truth-maker condition fails to make ED plausible,
then perhaps we can look elsewhere for an additional condition to crystallise the
view. Here, I will consider two alternative versions of restricted emotional
dogmatism inspired by restricted phenomenal dogmatist accounts provided by
McGrath and Markie, and argue that neither of these views can provide a plausible
framework for an emotional dogmatist view.
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4.1 Receptive seemings emotional dogmatism
Recall the gold prospector example which began our discussion of the over-
generalisation problem back in §2.1. In this case, the expert prospector’s perceptual
seeming that the pebble is gold arises from their learned identification skills, while
the wishful prospector’s perceptual seeming that the pebble is gold arises from their
desire to discover gold. The problem for basic PD was that it was unable to account
for the intuitive verdict that, while the expert may be justified on the basis of their
perceptual seemings, it is implausible that the wishful prospector’s seeming has the
same justificatory ability.
In light of counterexamples like this, McGrath (2013) aims to construct a
restricted version of phenomenal dogmatism which manages to exclude problematic
cases while also striving to retain the initial attractions of basic views. On this note,
McGrath suggests that what’s going wrong in cases like the wishful prospector is
that the perceptual seeming has what he refers to as a ‘‘quasi-inferential’’ (p. 228)
basis, i.e. the wishful prospector’s perceptual seeming that the pebble is gold does
not arise directly from perception but instead arises via an inference-like transition
or ‘jump’ from the base perceptual seeming that there is a yellowish pebble. The
relationship between the seemings here is ‘quasi-inferential’ insofar as exchanging
the seemings with corresponding beliefs containing the same propositional contents
would render the transition as an instance of inference between beliefs. For
McGrath, it is only seemings which do not have such a quasi-inferential basis—i.e.
receptive seemings—which are capable of providing immediate and defeasible
justification to the relevant belief. At best, seemings with a quasi-inferential basis
might be capable of conferring mediate justification to the relevant belief, but only if
it’s an epistemically good quasi-inference, i.e. only if the content of the base
seeming adequately supports the content of the quasi-inferred seeming.
Applying this to the example at hand, the wishful prospector has a receptive
perceptual seeming that there is a yellowish pebble. On McGrath’s account, the
prospector would be immediately justified in believing that there is a yellowish
pebble on the basis of this seeming. However, the prospector’s desire to discover
gold intervenes and produces a quasi-inferred perceptual seeming that the pebble is
gold. Because this perceptual seeming is quasi-inferred from the base perceptual
seeming that there is a yellowish pebble, it is not capable of immediately and
defeasibly justifying the prospector’s belief that the pebble is gold. Moreover, we
can see that this quasi-inference taking place is not an epistemically legitimate one.
The seeming with the content ‘there is a yellowish pebble’ does not sufficiently
support the content of the quasi-inferred seeming, i.e. ‘the pebble is a gold nugget’.
Hence, the wishful prospector is in no way justified in their belief that the pebble is
gold on the basis of their perceptual seemings.
So, if this looks like a plausible view with respect to perceptual seemings, we can
construct an analogous emotional dogmatist view as follows:
Receptive Seemings Emotional Dogmatism (RSED): S’s emotional experi-
ence is capable of immediately and defeasibly justifying her evaluative belief
that an object O instantiates an evaluative property E if and only if (i) the
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experience makes it seem to her that O is E, and (ii) this seeming does not
have a quasi-inferential basis.
Now, to some degree, the question of whether RSED constitutes an improvement
on RED hinges on whether RSED gives us the right result in emotional over-
generalisation cases; whether it correctly diagnoses what’s going wrong with the
suspicious interviewer’s emotional seeming, for example, and has the philosophical
tools to exclude it from being capable of conferring justification. Here’s the
problem. While the notion of receptivity may be plausible with respect to perceptual
seemings and perceptual over-generalisation cases, it’s not obvious that it translates
well to the emotional case. There’s a question of whether any emotional seemings
are receptive, and not quasi-inferred from other seemings, given that emotions have
what Deonna and Teroni (2012) refer to as ‘‘cognitive bases’’ (p. 5). That is, unlike
perceptions, emotions rely on base mental states such as perceptions, beliefs, and so
forth. I can’t experience fear in response to the approaching snake without in some
way perceiving the snake and its fearsome-making features. The same is not true of
visually perceiving the snake; my visual experience of the snake does not
presuppose a further mental state in the same way that my emotional experience
does. In light of this fact, then, we might wonder how any emotional experience can
involve a seeming that an object instantiates a particular evaluative property without
that seeming being quasi-inferred from non-emotional seemings pertaining to the
non-evaluative features of the object.10
This is a problem because, if it is the case that all or most emotional seemings are
quasi-inferred from the seemings of their cognitive bases (i.e. perceptual seemings,
introspective seemings, etc.), it looks like RSED can’t explain the intuitive
epistemic difference between legitimately and illegitimately produced emotional
seemings. Reconsider two versions of the suspicious interviewer case. In one
scenario, the interviewer’s emotional seeming that the candidate is duplicitous is
caused by legitimate observations of duplicitous-making features of the candidate,
whereas the other scenario involves the emotional seeming being caused by
illegitimate background biases. For RSED, what has to be going wrong in the bad
case is that the interviewer’s emotional seeming that the candidate is duplicitous is
quasi-inferred from another seeming, and is thereby incapable of lending immediate
justification to the evaluative belief that the candidate is duplicitous. But, as we’ve
seen above, it looks like both the good and the bad case involve quasi-inferred
emotional seemings. If merely being non-receptive makes a seeming incapable of
conferring immediate justification, then RSED generates the same result for both the
good and bad cases of suspicious interviewer.
In response, the defender of RSED might argue that the view can still explain the
intuitive difference in epistemic capacity between the emotional seemings involved
10 There’s a question here as to whether the emotions’ dependence on their cognitive bases bars them
from ever conferring immediate justification to evaluative belief. This is an important and complex
question, and has been discussed at length by Milona and Naar (2020) and Cowan (2018). Given that this
is pertinent to anybody interested in bestowing emotional experience with immediate justificatory power,
and given my focus on problems specific to dogmatist views, a full discussion of this challenge is beyond
the scope of what I can discuss here.
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in both cases. That is, they may point to the difference in epistemic quality in each
quasi-inference as what explains the intuition that the emotional seeming produced
by legitimate observations is better epistemically placed than the seeming produced
by illegitimate bias. Recall that a quasi-inferential basis need not rob the seeming of
all of its justificatory power. If it is a good quasi-inference, i.e. if the content of the
base seeming adequately supports the content of the quasi-inferred seeming, then
the quasi-inferred seeming can transmit mediate justification to the relevant belief.
The defender of RSED might argue that in the good case, i.e. the case in which the
emotional seeming that the candidate is duplicitous is quasi-inferred from the
perceptual seeming which has as its content the relevant conjunction of duplicitous-
making non-evaluative features of the candidate (i.e. their behaviours and
mannerisms), the quasi-inference is legitimate insofar as the content of the base
perceptual seeming adequately supports the content of the emotional seeming. On
the other hand, consider the bias case. Presumably, the emotional seeming that the
candidate is duplicitous will be quasi-inferred from perceptual seemings with
different contents, e.g. if it’s a sexist bias, then the emotional seeming that the
candidate is duplicitous will be quasi-inferred from the base perceptual seeming that
the candidate is a woman. Clearly, this is not a legitimate quasi-inference. In other
words, there’s an illegitimate ‘jump’ in the bias quasi-inference that isn’t present in
the good case, and this is what explains the difference in epistemic status between
the two cases.
Even if this is a plausible way of explaining the intuitive difference between the
two suspicious interviewer cases, it still doesn’t get us where we want to go given
that we’ve been interested in how emotional phenomenology can immediately
justify our evaluative beliefs. If it is the case that emotional seemings can only ever
transmit mediate justification generated by perceptual (or introspective, etc.)
seemings, then RSED cannot account for emotional experience as a source of
unmediated epistemic justification. Recall that one of the main selling points of
emotional dogmatism concerns its ability to provide low-cost justification to a rich
catalogue of our evaluative beliefs. This capacity, which is essential for providing
dogmatists with the resources to answer sceptical worries pertaining to the
acquisition of various epistemic goods, crucially depends on the immediacy of the
justification. If the justification provided by seemings must instead meet further
epistemic requirements, such as being suitably related to the content of the subject’s
non-emotional seemings and existing justified beliefs, then we give argumentative
sway back to the sceptic, and thereby lose the distinctive virtue of dogmatism.
Therefore, because eliminating immediacy from dogmatism eliminates a substan-
tive percentage of the theory’s philosophical attractions, and because RSED requires
eschewing immediacy, McGrath’s receptivity-based view cannot be a suitable the-
oretical framework for emotional dogmatism.
4.2 Knowledge-how emotional dogmatism
Finally, let’s consider Markie’s view. Returning to the gold prospector case, a
natural suggestion as to why the expert prospector’s perceptual seeming enjoys
justificatory power is that the expert knows what gold looks like; the novice doesn’t
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have anything close to this knowledge. One way of spelling out the problem with
basic PD is that it can’t account for the fact that this ought to make a difference
between the epistemic status of the expert’s and novice’s belief. In light of this,
Markie (2013) proposes a qualified view of phenomenal dogmatism which restricts
the type of seemings capable of possessing justificatory power to seeming
experiences brought about by the agent’s exercise of the relevant knowledge-how
capacity.
To summarise Markie’s view, merely having a perceptual seeming is insufficient
for immediate and defeasible justification. A further condition must be met, namely
that the subject must have the relevant knowledge-how capacity to recognise the
relevant property and the seeming must be appropriately related to that capacity, i.e.
the knowledge-how plays a substantive causal role in bringing about the seeming.
On Markie’s view, what possessing a knowledge-how capacity amounts to is the
subject possessing a disposition to experience the relevant seemings upon
perceptually apprehending certain features of the object in question, e.g. the expert
prospector has the knowledge-how capacity to perceptually identify gold nuggets
insofar as they are disposed to have the perceptual seeming that a pebble is gold
when apprehending certain gold-making features of the object. Moreover, that
subject’s disposition is, as Markie puts it, ‘‘determined by’’ (p. 264) their having the
right sort of background information, e.g. that an object which has certain features
and looks a certain way is gold. Finally, on Markie’s account, having this
background information is a matter of having evidence that justifies the subject in
believing, in this case, that an object which looks a certain way is gold.
So, if this view looks like it’s generating the right result in the perceptual case,
we can transpose it into an emotional dogmatist view as follows:
Knowledge-How Emotional Dogmatism (KHED): S’s emotional experience is
capable of immediately and defeasibly justifying her evaluative belief that an
object O instantiates an evaluative property E if and only if (i) the experience
makes it seem to her that O is E, and (ii) the experience makes it seem to her
that O is E in virtue of her knowledge of how to emotionally identify
something as being E.
For KHED, my emotional experience of fear towards the snake is capable of
immediately and defeasibly justifying my evaluative belief that the snake is
fearsome if and only if my experience makes it seem to me that the snake is
fearsome and I have this emotional seeming as the result of my knowledge of how
to emotionally identify something as fearsome. Analogously to the perceptual case
above, a subject’s knowledge-how capacity to emotionally identify something as
fearsome involves the possession of a disposition to experience emotional seemings
of fearsomeness upon attending to certain features of the object or situation.
Moreover, I possess this disposition at least partly by virtue of my having the
relevant background information, i.e. what makes fearsome things fearsome.
The good news for KHED is that the addition of the knowledge-how condition on
seemings places the view in a much better position than RED to be able to handle
over-generalisation cases. Take the case in which the interviewer’s suspicious
emotional seemings towards the candidate are produced by an illegitimate bias as
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opposed to legitimate observations of duplicitous-making features of the candidate.
KHED is able to provide a straightforward explanation as to why the interviewer’s
emotional seemings do not justify them in believing that the candidate is
duplicitous, i.e. the suspicious seeming is experienced by virtue of the interviewer
harbouring illicit biases, not by virtue of their knowledge of how to emotionally
identify duplicitousness. The interviewer whose emotional seemings do arise as a
result of legitimate observations of duplicitous-making features, however, plausibly
does enjoy justification for their belief that the candidate is duplicitous insofar as
their experiencing the seemings as a result of those legitimate observations is an
exercise of her knowledge-how capacity to identify duplicitousness.
However, KHED faces two problems. The first of which is that, again, it’s not
clear that this account paints a plausible picture of immediate justification. Since
justification-conferring emotional seemings must be the result of an exercise of a
knowledge-how capacity, and since this capacity is determined by the possession of
background information that would justify the relevant evaluative proposition, it’s
not obvious that KHED is capturing the phenomenon that we set out to explain. The
second worry is that attributing so much weight to the possession of the relevant
background information that determines one’s disposition to have the relevant
emotional seemings (and thereby the relevant knowledge-how capacity) threatens to
render emotional phenomenology epistemically superfluous. That is, there’s a
serious question of what justificatory work the emotional seemings are doing if the
brunt of the epistemic labour has already been done by the subject insofar as she has
the background information required to justify her belief that a given object
instantiates the relevant evaluative property.
So, while KHED looks promising insofar as it seems better placed to handle over-
generalisation cases, we see on closer inspection that it is unable to explain the
immediate justificatory power of emotional experience, and threatens to make
emotional phenomenology epistemically superfluous. Markie’s knowledge-how
account, then, is not a suitable framework for an analogous emotional dogmatist
view.
4.3 Summing up
Here, I have considered and rejected four possible emotional dogmatist views. Basic
emotional dogmatism fails in virtue of being too liberal with respect to the types of
emotional experiences it bestows with justificatory power, and the attempt to restrict
emotional dogmatism with the Chudnoff-inspired truth-maker condition fails in
virtue of falling foul to a troubling dilemma in what seeming awareness of truth-
makers consists in. I’ve also aimed to show that alternative options for restricting
emotional dogmatism, i.e. views analogous to those advanced by McGrath and
Markie, cannot provide a plausible account as to how emotional experience can
immediately justify evaluative belief.
To be clear, the purpose of this discussion has not been to provide a conceptual
argument for the failure of every instantiation of the emotional dogmatist view, nor
have I endeavoured to show that emotional experience is altogether incapable of
immediately and defeasibly justifying belief. Rather, by levelling these arguments
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against ED, RED, RSED, and KHED, I have aimed to build an inductive case
against the possibility of a plausible emotional dogmatist view. In lieu of an
undiscovered dogmatist instantiation which does not fall foul to the above
objections, we have good reason to reject the idea that emotional phenomenology is
what makes emotional experience capable of immediately justifying evaluative
belief.
What remains an open question is whether emotional seeming states might be
capable of lending justification to evaluative belief mediated by other mental states
and beliefs. As we’ve seen from §4.1 and §4.2, it may be possible to provide an
explanation as to how emotional seemings can perform some epistemic role in
transmitting justification initially generated by either receptive perceptual seemings
in McGrath’s case or by the background information which constitutes the relevant
knowledge-how capacity for Markie. Determining whether emotional experience
has this epistemic capacity, however, is a task for another paper. For now, I
conclude that the prospects of emotional dogmatism, as a straightforward analogue
of phenomenal dogmatism, are bleak.
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